Information Acquisition and In
时间：2011-05-01 21:02:38 文章分类：思考评论
Information Acquisition and Institutional DesignArticle by Matthew C. Stephenson
Although good information is critical to effective decisionmaking, public agents’ private incentives to invest in gathering information may not align with the social interest in their doing so. This Article considers how legal-institutional design choices affect government decisionmakers’ incentive to invest in information, as well as how to manage the inevitable trade-off between promoting efficient use of information ex post and stimulating efficient acquisition of information ex ante. Using a simple theoretical framework, the Article considers a range of techniques for incentivizing information gathering, with particular attention to the structure of public institutions and public law.
Although good information is critical to effective decisionmaking, public agents’ private incentives to invest in gathering information may not align with the social interest in their doing so. This Article considers how legal-institutional design choices affect government decisionmakers’ incentive to invest in information, as well as how to manage the inevitable trade-off between promoting efficient use of information ex post and stimulating efficient acquisition of information ex ante. Using a simple theoretical framework, the Article considers a range of techniques for incentivizing information gathering, with particular attention to the structure of public institutions and public law.
执业机构：广东金桥百信（肇庆）律师事务所
所在地：广东 肇庆市
手机号码：15811286610
擅长领域：
刑事辩护 常年顾问 经济仲裁 合同纠纷 知识产权 行政复议 招标投标 工程建筑 房产纠纷 金融证券
所在地：广东 肇庆市
手机号码：15811286610
擅长领域：
刑事辩护 常年顾问 经济仲裁 合同纠纷 知识产权 行政复议 招标投标 工程建筑 房产纠纷 金融证券
